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ABSTRACT: Spinoza’s philosophy is often characterized as a philosophy
sub specie aeternitatis where time and temporality are notions without
an expressive role. Consequently, understanding human history by
means of the Ethics — using geometric demonstrations supported by
metaphysical terms—andwithout the aid of the notion of time, can be
considered as leading to an unsolvable problem. In this chapter, I draw
upon Spinoza’s refusal of finalism to propose a renewed investigation
about Spinozism and the issue of temporality, asking the question:
could the absence of time in Spinoza’s work and his writings on effi-
cient and immanent causality allow us to rethink a theory of history?
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Temporality and History in Spinoza
The Refusal of Teleological Thought
ERICKA MARIE ITOKAZU
INTRODUCTION: SPINOZIST ISSUES BETWEEN MATERIALISM
AND IDEALISM
Some remarkable studies have shown Baruch Spinoza’s influence
on various materialist traditions and even on idealist philosophies.1
Wherever he is quoted there seems to be some sort of dispute over
the recognition of Spinoza as a predecessor of that particular tradi-
tion. However, there is a general consensus of the idea that Spinozism
implies the refusal of any transcendent entity and the assertion of a
radical immanence inextricably linked to the denial of final causality
and teleology.
All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this
one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act,
as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as
1 Vittorio Morfino, Genealogia di un pregiudizio. L’immagine di Spinoza in Germania da
Leibniz a Marx (Hildesheim: Olms, 2016); The New Spinoza, ed. by Warren Montag
and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1997); Yirmiyahu Yovel,
Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989); André Tosel, Du matérialisme, de Spinoza (Paris: Kimé,
1994).
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certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end,
for they say that God made all things for man, and man that
he might worship God. […] Thus this prejudice was changed
into superstition, and struckdeep roots in theirminds.Thiswas
why each of them strovewith great diligence to understand and
explain the final causes of all things.2
Given this striking statement from the Ethics’ Appendix, Spinoza’s re-
jection of finalism is almost undisputed. The foundation of the New
Science as a modern project seems to depend on taking finalism out
of the laws of nature (Philosophia naturalis). This teleology was pre-
served, however, by RenéDescartes in regard to God’s will and human
freewill (Primaphilosophia)—inwhich cases freedomdetermines the
possible and the contingent.
The refusal of the teleological explanations for both Prima philo-
sophia and Philosophia naturalis could be the key to understanding
why Spinoza’s philosophy is of interest to so few scholars of history.3
After all, by refusing to give any ontological status to the categories of
possibility and contingency, his philosophy seems to reduce human
actions to fatalism, especially if understood in terms of the rigid law
of Philosophia naturalis. By a mistaken understanding of the efficient
cause, the laws of nature are reduced to a restrictive form of necessary
causality, thus making human freedom almost impossible to conceive.
Moreover, the idealist tradition of Spinozism has often rejected his
Prima philosophia precisely because there is no place for free will and
a fundamental notion of the theories of history, i.e. time.4 On the
2 Ethics i, App.;CWS [TheCollectedWorks of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i, pp. 440–41.
3 For example, Yovel recognizes that Spinoza’s radical immanence and the refusal of all
transcendent entities influenced Ludwig Feuerbach’s concept of self-alienation as man
projecting his essence outward into a separate, divine world, from which this essence
then confronts him as external and oppressive (see Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics,
pp. 73–74); nevertheless, Yovel alsowrites: ‘meanwhile, we should address the broader
question of teleology, which prompted our discussion of Marx in first place. Based
upon the foregoing analysis of man-in-nature, how does Marx’s philosophy of imman-
ence — lacking an inherent teleology while maintaining a historical perspective —
trace its own way between Hegel and Spinoza’? (ibid., p. 93).
4 As Vittorio Morfino notes in Plural Temporality: Transindividuality and the Aleatory
between Spinoza and Althusser (Leiden: Brill, 2014), ‘The powerful acosmic interpret-
ation of Spinoza [is] magnificently expressed in the following lines by Bloch’ (p. 14):
‘Theworld stands here as a crystal, with the sun at its peak, so that nothing casts a shadow.
[…] Time is missing, history is missing, development is missing and especially any
concrete multiplicity in the one ocean of substance. […] Spinozism stands there as if
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one hand, under the rigid laws of nature and necessary causality, we
have a materialist fatalism (and the impossibility of freedom); on the
other hand, by refusing free will and the notion of time, we have the
impossibility of temporality in human history.
This chapter’s proposal is to rethink Spinoza’s rejection of finalism,
and to relate the question of time to the problemof the final cause. I ask
whether our understanding of Spinoza’s critique of time as a refusal of
teleological thought is successful or not, and whether thinking history
as a non-teleological process could be possible. Furthermore, I clarify
whether or not this can be done without the central notion of time.
To avoid creating any anachronisms, I shall only propose a
hypothetical outline as to what the Spinozist critique of a historico-
teleological thinking could be. After all, the theory of history is not a
seventeenth-century problem. However, it is precisely that century
that may provide the only philosophy actually capable of countering
the kind of finalism which theories of history rely upon.5 This is the
case insofar as one considers all historico-teleological thinking to
depend upon the following four conditions:
1. the linearity of time;
2. a temporality that is progressively determined towards the fu-
ture;
3. a continuity of time established by means of a relation between
successive instants external to each other (in order to get rid
of fatalism). That is, the connection between past, present, and
future should not be determined by necessary causality but by
free causality;
4. as a result, and in order to be able to conceive of praxis, human
actions must be determinable, by themselves or accidentally,
because they are possible actions. They are determinable by free
therewas eternal noon in the necessity of theworld, in the determinismof its geometry
and of its both carefree and situationless crystal— sub specie aeternitatis’ (Ernst Bloch,
The Principle of Hope, trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 3 vols
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), ii, pp. 852–53).
5 The following arguments are a tentative attempt to reproduce, with a Spinozist lexicon,
the thesis that ‘democracy is a historical question’ made byMarilena Chaui, ‘A questão
democrática’, in her Cultura e democracia: o discurso competente e outras falas (São
Paulo: Cortez, 2006), pp. 144–69 (p. 145).
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will, but they are not necessary actions, that is, they are not
already determined by nature. If these actions carry out their
final goal, such an outcome would therefore be unpredictable
and have to be explained in contingent terms.
This being said, I’d like to highlight the most important arguments
of Ethics i. In this section, Spinoza demonstrates that the infinitely
infinite, the one unique substance, is the cause of itself and operates by
immanent, necessary, and efficient causality over the whole of nature
(be it the Natura Naturans or the Natura Naturata). Extension and
Thought are thus no longer independent substances, but attributes of
the same unique and absolutely infinite substance. In other words, this
viewpoint eliminates contingency, possibility, and finalistic causality.
In the famous Appendix, such categories (the contingent, the
possible, and the final cause) appear as substitutes accomplished by
human (imaginary) projections in twoways: firstly, the understanding
of necessity is replaced by the imagination of the accomplishment of
final causality; secondly, the inexorable interiority of immanent caus-
ality is imaginarily replaced by the impregnable exteriority of transitive
causality. I argue here that these projections and replacements are
made from a single instrument of imagination: time.
THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORALITY IN SPINOZA: THE NEGATIVITY
OF TIME
The most important texts to analyse Spinoza’s definitions of time are
his earlywritings. In theMetaphysicalThoughts, Spinoza’s ownposition
seems to be nothing but an account of Descartes’s philosophy, who
defined time as a being of reason (ens rationis) or a mode of thought
that serves to measure duration in the same way as number measures
motion. According to Descartes’s Meditations, if one exists, one is a
possible existence, and one’s duration thereforewill need a continuous
creation to actualize its possible existence. That is why an external
force, or in Descartes’s terms, God as an external and transcendent
causality, is required to maintain these created things in existence.
For a lifespan can be divided into countless parts, each com-
pletely independent of the others, so that it does not follow
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from the fact that I existed a little while ago that I must exist
now, unless there is some cause which as it were creates me
afresh at this moment — that is, which preserves me. For it is
quite clear to anyone who attentively considers the nature of
time that the same power and action are needed to preserve
anything at each individual moment of its duration as would
be required to create that thing anew if it were not yet in exist-
ence.Hence the distinction between preservation and creation
is only a conceptual one.6
Hence, duration consists of a linear, homogeneous, continuously and
punctually recreated existence. The same action and force is indeed
required at any instant, no matter how short this instant might be, to
recreate such an existence again and again, making all instants inde-
pendent from each other and thus detaching the present instant from
that which immediately preceded it. Moreover, because duration is
composed of parts and is divisible, it becomes measurable in the same
way that geometric space is measurable. That is, it becomes a geomet-
rized duration measured by geometric time.
In Spinoza’s early writings, therefore, time, number, and measure
seem to be legitimate beings of reason. This is why one finds a certain
transitivity between duration and that which measures it. Time and
duration, like Siamese twins, thus become neutral, homogeneous, and
perfect doubles of Extension as presented by Descartes’s Principles of
Philosophy in the section dedicated to physics.
Despite making use of Cartesian terminology, however, Spinoza’s
argument does not allow us to speak properly of an essence of time, for
it is neither an objective essence (i.e., an idea inside of us) nor a formal
essence (i.e., a condition of things outside of us). Although Spinoza
calls it a ‘being of reason’, he adds to this nomenclature the proviso
that, in spite of this choice of words, time cannot properly be called
a ‘being’.7 According to Spinoza, time has no formal reality. That is,
it has no existence outside of us. Furthermore, time has no objective
reality: it does not possess the status of an idea, be it true, false, or
fictitious. Time is not an essence inside of us, while outside of us it
6 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoot, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984–91), ii (1985), pp. 1–62 (p. 33).
7 CM i; CWS i, pp. 299–310.
60 TEMPORALITY AND HISTORY
has no existence. That is, it has no ontological density of any kind. To
summarize this idea, we can say that for Spinoza time is on the verge of
non-being.8
However, in 1663, Spinoza changed his position on this topic.
Duration, henceforth conceived as indivisible, resists the measures
that time would apply to it.9 After Spinoza’s Letter xii,10 it becomes
clear that those who explain duration through time fail to conceive of
it properly, for time is but a mere abstraction. Time loses its epistemo-
logical value and ceases to be a legitimate being of reason to become,
on a path of no return, one of the ‘aids of the imagination’ (auxilia
imaginationis). In the following section, we will see what changed in
Spinoza’s concept of duration.
THE POSITIVITY OF DURATION
Following the demonstrations of the Ethics, we understand that there
is no transcendent God above all ‘created things’, for they are now
called ‘finite things’ or just finite modes (or affections) of the infinite
substance, that is, God orNature (Deus sive Natura). In the definitions
of the Ethics, Spinoza argues that eternity and the duration of finite
modes are indivisible. This is the main difference with his earlier writ-
ings.
To understandwhat it is to be a finitemode requires apprehending
how, in this philosophy of immanence, Spinoza abandons the rela-
tion of transcendent causality between the infinite substance and its
finite modes. The necessity of the substance’s efficient cause is now
determined by immanent causality, which displays the inner relation
of substance’s power to the power of the substance’s finite modes,11
that is, the inner force of conatus: ‘each thing, as far as it can by its own
8 See Ericka Itokazu, ‘Au-delà du temps mesure. La question du temps chez Spinoza’, in
Ontologia e temporalità. Spinoza e i suoi lettori moderni, ed. by Giuseppe D’Anna and
Vittorio Morfino (Milano: Mimesis, 2012), pp. 387–98.
9 The displacement of the role of time in Spinoza’s philosophy is admirably explored
in the works of Chantal Jaquet (see especially her Sub specie æternitatis. Études des
concepts de temps, durée et éternité chez Spinoza (Paris: Kimé, 1997).
10 Ep. xii [Lodewijk Meyer]; CWS i, p. 200.
11 On this subject, I recommend the work of Nicolas Israël, Spinoza. Le temps de la
vigilance (Paris: Payot, 2001).
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power, strives to persevere in its being’ and ‘the striving by which each
thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence
of the thing’.12
Duration, therefore, is no longer understood as a successionwhose
continuity is homogeneously neutral and which is characterized by an
existential linearity restored instant after instant through continued
creation. Instead, duration is understood as continuous, no longer as
homogeneous or uniform, and certainly not as measurable by means
of the operations of time. On the contrary, duration itself is the ex-
pression of diverse, multiple, and heterogeneous movements, insofar
as the conatus—the constitutive inner power of duration— is also its
actual essence. Indeed, every variation of power — every simultaneous
affection of the body and of the mind — of this essence implies the
diverse, multiple, and heterogeneous passages of this very body and
this very mind. This is why, as is the case with the substance, duration
is not divisible. Because it is the very characteristic of finite modes,
duration can only be conceived of as a whole from which no parts can
be divided.
In fact, after Spinoza’s Letter xii, it is perfectly clear that duration
can no longer be related to time. Not only is immanent causality the
very core of Spinoza’s thought, but it also constitutes a profound shift
away from Cartesian philosophy. In Spinoza, one no longer has to
cope with the complex problem of a divisible duration conceived as
a succession of instants external to each other, precisely because this
succession of instants requires the action of an external cause without
which we simply could not understand how we continue to exist.
Hence, with Spinoza, finitemodes are no longer understood as instant-
aneous possible existences, and duration ceases to be dependent on
God’s continued creation (contra Descartes). The relation between
the infinite and the finite is no longer that of an opposition between
the eternal and the instantaneous, nor is it an external relation. Rather,
the relation between the infinite and the finite is an internal or, better
yet, an immanent relation.
12 Ethics ii, 6 and 7; CWS i, p. 499.
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In such a philosophy, a finite thing is defined as that which ‘can
be limited by another of the same nature’.13 Using this definition —
certainly one of the finest in the history of philosophy — Spinoza
explains finitude as simply the fact of being among and in relationship
with other finite beings. Thus, finitude is no longer characterized by
ephemerality or mortality, and instead thought of as the fact that all
existences are always interconnected. To be a finite thingmeans simply
to co-exist, to exist with other singular things: finitude is precisely the
reciprocal determining factor of the existence of finite things.
The co-existence of this conatus with and among other finite
modes is shaped and characterized by multiple movements of body
compositions, re-compositions, and decompositions, interwoven
through many encounters and disagreements, and through the
immeasurable production of desires (conatus-cupiditas), joys, and
sorrows of affective life, be they individual or collective.
If duration is no longer understood as succession, if it cannot be
reduced to a mere linear continuation — i.e. to a continuity whose
ability to be measured comes from its being emptied of any of the
movements that are proper to its existence — then how should one
understand Spinoza’s definition of duration as ‘an indefinite continu-
ation of existing’?14 To be clear, here, the term ‘indefinite’ does not
mean indeterminate. Spinoza uses this adjective (‘indefinite’) to define
duration because a finite existence is not determined by its actual es-
sence. That is, the limitation of a finite existence is not determined by
its inner efficient cause (derived from the immanence of the substance
within the conatus’ essence) that makes it exist and, in itself, could
never make it cease to exist.15
Herewe can apply some lessonswe have learned fromLetter xii to
theEthics, for in that letter Spinoza presented various definitions of the
‘infinite’: there are things we call ‘infinite, or if you prefer, indefinite’,16
he says, ‘because they cannot be equated with any number’ and we
might say, to no measure of time, ‘though they can be conceived to be
greater or lesser’ as in the case of conatus. Or, to quote the definition
13 Ethics i, Def. 2; CWS i, p. 408.
14 Ethics ii, Def. 5; CWS i, p. 447.
15 ‘The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite
time, but an indefinite time’ (Ethics iii, 8; CWS i, p. 499).
16 Ep. xii [Lodewijk Meyer]; CWS i, p. 205.
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given in Ethics iii, 4 Dem.: ‘For the definition of any thing affirms, and
does not deny, the thing’s essence, or it posits the thing’s essence, and
does not take it away’.17 Therefore the term from the Ethics, ‘indefin-
ite duration’, is derived from the absence of inner boundaries in the
conatus. Now, to assert the absence of an internal limit is precisely to
acknowledge and to affirm the internal positivity of the conatus and
to posit the absence of any inner negativity. In other words, to be
‘indefinite’ is our finite way of being infinite.
Duration is, so to speak, positively undefined. Its definition actu-
ally occurs through the unfolding of its power within the existential
field among many other finite modes. In the end, this dynamic defini-
tion results from the composition of experience as amosaic ofmultiple
affects, affections, and desires. Duration (or ‘the indefinite continu-
ation of existing’), therefore, far from indicating a negation or a lack
of determination, points to its opposite, that is, an immeasurable field
of dynamic determinations, interwoven through the relations of one’s
internal power to exist and actwith the external powers ofmanyothers.
In otherwords, existence is defined throughone’s various relationships
with the world, with living beings, with people, etc. When seen in
this way, duration is inseparable from the conatuswhich guarantees its
dynamic breadth and exceptional ontological density.18
It is impossible for us to strive for a complete definition of that
dynamic force within such ontological density. Duration is not only
indivisible but should also be understood as inapprehensible. Defining
the continuation of existence is precisely not to understand it as a
process, that is, as the movement of the conatus in its various internal
determinations and external limitations. To seek to define duration is
not to conceive of it but to confuse it with time. Or, to put it clearly,
to seek to intellectually define duration is to imagine it, rather than to
conceive of it; and as per Letter xii’s warning, to imagine duration is to
separate it from the substance, that is, to imagine efficient and immanent
causality in the shape of transcendent and external causality.
17 CWS i, p. 498.
18 The argument about the positivity of duration and the negativity of time is a part of a
major section frommy doctoral dissertation: ErickaMarie Itokazu, ‘Tempo, duração e
eternidade na filosofia de Espinosa’ (Universidade de São Paulo (USP), 2008) <https:
//www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-18032009-110714/pt-br.php>
[accessed 02 July 2020].
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For this reason, Spinoza affirms that we are bound to have only an
extremely inadequate knowledge of our duration or of the duration of
the singular things outsideus,19 sincewe arebound to imagine efficient
causality in the shape of transitive causality. The interesting thing is
that the same restriction that impedes adequate knowledge and any
satisfactory definition of duration now seems to open up a wide range
of determinations and movements of our power in the unfolding (sub
duratione) of existing and acting.
Sub duratione, the non-definition of duration, is the corollary of
our existence among other existences which is identical to the process
of singular things in the intertwining of simultaneous encounters of
composition or decomposition—acontrariety or complementarity of
images and relations — but also in the union or opposition of forces.
In other words, sub duratione is the very nature of themodal condition
of finite things in continuous and multiple sets of relations to other
existences, but above all it is a continuous process of power (potentia),
that is, the perseverance in one’s own being.
It should be noted that there are two distinct processes which
are not equivalent even though they may seem similar. As per Ethics
ii, we know that a body cannot be conceived of as an isolated unit
amongst other bodies, since to be a singular thing is to be an individual
composed of many others, each of which is also composed by many
other individuals, etc.20 From the concept of body, Spinoza charac-
terizes a continuous process of composition and decomposition with
other bodies, as though self-regeneration21 were occurring thanks to
the relations with other internal and external individuals within what
we can call amultiple and continuous process of singularization occurs.
However, in Ethics iii and iv, after the demonstrations concerning
the conatus, Spinoza highlights another process which is relevant here:
these singular things can then constitute, in their actual essence, a com-
positional or oppositional power in relationship with other external
19 Ethics ii, 30 and 31; CWS i, pp. 471–72.
20 ‘By singular things I understand things that are finite and have determinate existence.
And if a number of individuals so concur in an action that together they are all the
cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing’ (Ethics ii,
Def. 7; CWS i, p. 447).
21 Ethics ii, 13; CWS i, pp. 457–62.
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forces that have the possibility of not only diminishing this conatus but
also of destroying it.
In Spinoza’s political writings, our natural right is defined by our
power as a political expression of the conatus. Thus, a singular thing
is determined by the multiple relations of an individual conatus or
a collective one (as the multitudinis potentia) against external forces
(potestas) within which it strives to persevere in its own existence.
The duration of singular things is also inapprehensible in the political
process of this individual and collective conatus. Thus, they establish
relations with other forces that simultaneously determine their inner
ethical power to freedom or slavery, and their political power within
the various internal relations of a political body or against external
relations with a political potestas.
The central dynamics of composing or opposing ourselves (as in-
dividuals and as a collectivity) rests in both processes, in a continuous
definition of our existence: we are immersed in the world that we are
also comprised of, and we persist and endure as a singular and col-
lective conatus in and with this world as beings capable of producing
common affects and actions. One understands how, in this dual move-
ment of singularization and perseverance, which is also within the
continuously in-definition of ethical and political existence, duration
is as dense and thick from the ontological viewpoint as it is dynamic
and indomitable from the historical viewpoint.
THE POSITIVITY OF DURATION OR THE NEGATIVITY OF TIME?
From what we have just seen, it should be easy to understand why
Spinoza affirms that we may only have an extremely inadequate know-
ledge of duration. The in-apprehensibility of duration makes it im-
possible to conceive of it intellectually as a complete definition, which
forces us to (only) imagine it.This being said, the problem of time and
its relation to duration becomes harder and more complex at another
level. Indeed, imagination is not the source of error, as Spinoza demon-
strates; rather, the error consists precisely in taking imagination for
intellection, that is, taking a misconception for a concept.22 There are
22 Ethics ii, 17 Dem.; CWS i, pp. 465–66.
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things one can only conceive of and never imagine, such as eternity;
on the other hand, there are things one can only imagine and never
conceive of, such as one’s duration and the duration of external things.
The consequence is inexorable: seeking to understand duration
necessarily involves imagining it through time.And this is exactlywhat,
as Spinozawrote in Letter xii, separates us from the substance. I would
like to summarize the triple mechanism operated by time as follows:
a) First mechanism: we are inclined, by a natural impulse, to con-
fuse time with duration.23 We begin to divide the total and
indivisible inner force of duration into parts. We are inclined
to imagine our immanent force (our conatus) by means of the
image of transitive causality introduced by the negativity of
time.
The continuity of our existence becomes the experience of its own
fragmentation, since time does not bind one moment to another. On
the contrary, time itself is the division that splits the indivisible inner
force of duration into a before and an after, transforming the continu-
ity of a life into a contiguity of isolated moments. As a result, we get
used to smudging the ground on which the power of our existence un-
folds, so that we feel deeply alienated (ab aliio), that is, separated from
ourselves. To confuse duration with time is to be forced to deal with
the argument presented in Letter xii: ‘For composingDuration ofmo-
ments is the same as composingNumbermerely by adding noughts’.24
Transitive causality replaces desire’s immanent determination (our
conatus-cupiditas) for the emptiness of free will (its misconception).
The emergence of time reveals the eclipse of the conatus, transforming
the power of a life into a non-power to live.
b) Secondmechanism: althoughneither number, normeasure, nor
time have any reality of their own, many ‘have confused these
three [aids of the imagination] with things themselves’.25 Thus,
to confuse time with duration produces a concrete effect, that
23 Ep. xii [Lodewijk Meyer]; CWS i, p. 202.
24 Ibid., 204.
25 Ibid.
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is, the imaginary construction of the reality of time outside of
us.
This argument has a mirroring relation to the preceding argument.
Given that duration is perceived as extremely fragmented, and living
is perceived as various split instants that do not support their own
continuity, we endeavour to imagine the consistency of our existence
maintained by an exterior and continuous support. As an imaginary
replica of Descartes’s continued creation, we will imagine an endless
and external time, an eternity which is the sole imaginary entity cap-
able of colligating the split instants within oneself. Time becomes an
external reality outside of us, and its mechanism and action are in-
dependent of all human actions. Since time is external, unrelated to
anything, and devoid of a beginning as well as of an end, it becomes
the symbol of the infinite beyond us. Our internal relation to the sub-
stance, established by immanent causality, will therefore be imagined
as the transcendent causality of the absolute above us.
However, because it is an imaginary construction, its very nature
is to present itself in various figures. It does not matter whether these
figures are linear or cyclical ones, eschatological or soteriological, for
they shall always be the metamorphic face of a Time edax rerum. One
cannot escape the order of nature. There, life is perceived as a strange
experience in which a single operator not only fragments the course of
life, but also merges the instants it has split, reversing the constitutive
power of the conatus from the inside out, and subsuming it under an
imaginary external power (potestas) of an infinite Time that devours
everything.
c) Third and final mechanism: of all aids of the imagination, only
time is able to fragment duration and to introduce, in a philo-
sophy of the necessary, the experience of contingency. As long
as one exists, one’s conatus, the striving inner force to per-
severe in existence, is also one’s actual essence. Even though
essence and existence are inalienable pairs, in this paradoxical
and imaginary experience, time (and time only) is capable of
clandestinely alienating the inalienable.
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This is why the operation of time introduces contingency and possibil-
ity, notions that Spinoza defines as themisconception of the necessary
bond between essence and existence.26 The ontological density of the
conatus’ inner process in singular things, necessarily determined by
their intertwined co-existence, is now dissolved by the fiction that all
things are individually isolated, for they are now separated from the
substance and turned into particular thingswhose existence is corrupt-
ible by the contingency of the world.
For each singular thing […] must be determined by another
singular thing to exist and produce effects in a certain and
determinate way, and this again by another, and so to infinity.
But sincewehavedemonstrated from this commonproperty of
singular things that we have only a very inadequate knowledge
of durationof our body,we shall have to draw the same conclusion
concerning duration of singular things. […] From this it follows
that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we
can have no adequate knowledge of their duration, and that
is what we must understand by contingency of things and
the possibility of their corruption. For beyond that there is no
contingency.27
These three mechanisms are the source of the multiple variations of
desire (conatus-cupiditas) that are related to Ethics iv and its demon-
strations of Human Bondage (De servitute humana). The Powers of
the Affects (Affectuum viribus), or their intensity, is connected with
temporal operations which determine hope, fear, despair, security,
and flutuatio animi, all of which are temporal affects and fundamental
political passions. The ‘future contingents’, the possible existence and
corruption of the world, Fors Fortunae, and servitude: all of these
images contribute to an internal superstition which is based on a pas-
sion forged by time, just like fear that simultaneously requires hope
about the image of an external entity upon which we are dependent
andwhich reinforces all theologico-political power.This could include
the image of the impossible union with the infinite of an eternal and
26 Cf. Ethics iv, Def. 3; CWS i, p. 546: ‘I call singular things contingent insofar as we find
nothing, while we attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their existence or
which necessarily excludes it’. See also Ethics iv, Def. 4; CWS i, p. 546: ‘I call the same
singular thingspossible, insofar as, wedo not knowwhether those causes are determined
to produce them’; my emphasis.
27 Ethics iii, 31 Dem. and Corol.; CWS i, p. 472.
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transcendent God, or the secular image of the end of history, or the
image of a final emancipation of humanity in which we overcome our
endless andmiserable present.The soteriological or the eschatological
expectations are both temporal projections of finalist thought that in-
stil fear and hope in the heart of one’s affective life.
Spinoza defines fear as an inconstant sadness and hope as an
inconstant joy, and writes that they are both ‘born from the idea of
a future or a past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt’.28
Fear and hope, however, are so inconstant that they take the shape of
existential doubt, and in this case we might understand that to doubt
is not to affirm the power of our existence. On the contrary, doubt
suspends our ability to act, that is to say, it suspends the action of our
conatus.That iswhySpinoza explains that there is no fearwithout hope,
and there is no hope without fear. The inability to act is introduced by
the negativity of time; the soul’s vacillation of mind is the passion that
mostmakes us politically and existentially powerless. Vacillation is like
being a prisoner of permanent doubt floating between fear and hope.
It is an affective experience of impotence, of lacking power to act, as if
we were all merely possible existences in a contingent world.
Removing doubt about the ‘uncertainty of the future’ is the same
as requiring that the conatus gets rid of the impossible image of the
same future being simultaneously fearsome and hopeful, even though
this amounts to cultivating the fiction of an ‘uncertain present’ that
brings the promise of our ‘possibility to act’.Through such an inversion
of images, it is ‘the present’ that would become ‘uncertain’. It becomes
open to the imaginary possibility of human actions as a decision to-
wards a better future, that is, the false image of free will and the very
definition of finalist thought. To avoid the powerless effort of a suspen-
ded existence due to the vacillation of mind and in order not to expect
the impossible disclosure of future times in the present (the verge of
despair), some effort to build a resistance to doubt is required. The
introduction of an action is required, even if it is the image of free will
seeking the good: the closest affective image of some certainty, a fragile
and necessary pulse of the conatus from within passional life.
28 See Ethics iii, DA 12 and 13; CWS i, p. 534.
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How can we understand that same process outside of finalist
thought and within the operation of the efficient cause?
First, by paying attention to the fact that these teleological op-
erations reveal another important concept in Spinoza: utilitas. As he
defines it: ‘By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be
useful to us’,29 and ‘by the end for the sake of which we do some-
thing I understand appetite’.30 These definitions are clearly reinverting
what has already been inverted by our imaginarymisconception.Thus,
Spinoza uses the lexicon of teleological thought, a corollary of servile
imagination, precisely to escape servitude. This is why, in Ethics iv, he
explains that onemust differentiate the ‘contingent’ from the ‘possible’.
The distinction between these images determines the intensity of dis-
tinct passionswhich aremore or less subservient to fortune.31 Further,
they determine different interrelations of human actions within the
political body that produce different dynamics inside of it — trans-
forming fear and hope into either security (certainty of a future joy),
or into despair (certainty of a future sadness)— and explain the social
dynamics of a political body, generating a higher or lesser propensity
to either freedom or servitude.
Our appetite (our efficient cause), based on its imagination as a fi-
nal causality andon its imaginedquest forwhat is good(utilitas), in fact
proposes a determination in order to rid itself of the doubt and uncer-
tainty brought forth by our fears and hopes. For this, it is required that
the conatus push aside the fearsome image of contingent futures, even
though this amounts to fostering the imaginary construction of an uncer-
tain present.The confrontation of the conatus’ determinations with the
contingent future, even if it is through imagined free will and finalism,
thus produces an individual action, or a cooperation of individuals in
action, which, in turn, develops into a renewed effort (isolated or in
common) to transform the image of the contingent future into another
possible future. That is actually and precisely the appropriation of the
present time. The same mechanism can also simultaneously explain,
29 Ethics iv, Def. 1; CWS i, p. 546.
30 Ethics iv, Def. 7; CWS i, p. 547.
31 ‘An affect toward a thing which we know does not exist in the present, and which
we imagine as possible, is more intense, other things being equal, than one towards
a contingent thing’ (Ethics iv, 12; CWS i, p. 552).
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in terms of passional processes, the corporal imaginary constructions
that survive through the actions of time (be it an individual or political
body).The traces ofmemory (vestigia corporis) and socialmemories,32
as well as the corporal striving to maintain the image of its own ex-
istence, is what is expressed by the internal dynamic of resisting, or
renewing,33 the culture, language, customs, habits, rites, and ceremon-
ies.
CONCLUSION: SPINOZA AND HISTORY
We can now see how both the denial of time’s ontological status and
the positive density of the conatus is likely to change one’s views on
Spinozism. Tempus is not an essence, existence, res, idea, or epistemo-
logical value for knowledge or the sciences. This is perhaps so because
time is precisely this innate negativity, or the only instrument capable
of introducing thefissures of contradictionwithin the intense andplain
positivity of duration. This is precisely what we were looking for: the
connection between the positivity of duration and the negativity of
time seems, little by little, to reveal itself as the dynamic composition of
the existential human realm (be it individual or collective) of striving
in existencewith all its consequenceswithin the realms of imagination,
ethics, and, above all, politics.
To conclude, one might ask how to understand the historical pro-
cess implied by these remarks. The question about the relationship
between history and time can be renewed. To seek a theory of history
with the notion of time turns out to be an idealized abstraction that
surrenders to the temptations of finalist thought, and an error that con-
founds knowledge with imagination, a concept with a misconception,
and a science with an ideology.
In contrast, to understand history sub duratione amounts to re-
thinking the challenges of a materialist conception of history. Given
the in-apprehensibility of duration and its ontological positivity, the
32 See Laurent Bove, La Stratégie du conatus. Affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza (Paris:
Vrin, 1996) and Lorenzo Vinciguerra, Spinoza et le signe. La Genèse de l’imagination
(Paris: Vrin, 2005).
33 ‘An affect whose cause we imagine to bewith us in the presentmoment is stronger than
if we did not imagine it to be with us’ (Ethics iv, 9; CWS i, p. 551).
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historical process maintains in itself an overture to immeasurable
and indomitable determinations for multiple images and operations
of time, which contain passions and actions of reciprocal relations
between conatus. The affectuum viribus is now determined by the op-
position of affects: ‘By opposite affects I shall understand, in what
follows, those which pull a man differently, although they are of the
same genus — such as gluttony and greed, which are species of love,
and are opposite not by nature, but accidentally’.34 The accidental is
entirely different from the contingent and the possible, and not related
to time. Spinoza designates the accidental as that which constantly
modifies the inner force of our conatus through the relations between
things of the same genus in a multitude of affections and affects, which
are multiple interconnections of various and diverse durations con-
stantly composing andde-composing the complex thread of a dynamic
tissue of the maintenance of their own existence, in other words, their
own historicity.
If one thinks of the movement of history as a non-teleological
process, and if one thinks about the relation between materialism and
history in Spinoza’s philosophy, perhaps the answer can simply be
this: human actions do not occur according to a succeeding temporal
framework (characterized by transitive and final causality), whether
it is pursuing a linear, cyclic, progressive, or regressive time, since
human history does not move through time. On the contrary, it is
the imagination of time experiencing accidental causes (through the
multiple efficient and partial causalities intertwining and presenting in
our own power) that mobilizes us into history.
TRANSLATED BY BAPTISTE GRASSET
34 Ethics iv, Def. 5; CWS i, p. 546.
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